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STATE OF NEW YORK 
SUPREME COURT COUNTY OF ALBANY 
In The Matter of RONALD DAVIDSON, 
Petitioner, 
-against- 
ROBERT DENNISON, Chair, 
New York State Division of Parole, 
Respondent, 
For A Judgment Pursuant to Article 78 
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules. 
Appearances : 
Supreme Court Albany County Article 78 Term 
Hon. George B. Ceresia, Jr., Supreme Court Justice Presiding 
RJI ## 01-07-ST7745 Index No. 3942-07 
Law Offices of Glenn W. Magnell 
Attorney For Petitioner 
162 Main Street 
Goshen, New York 10924 
(Glenn W. Mangell, Esq., of Counsel) 
Andrew M. Cuomo 
Attorney General of the 
State of New York 
Attorney For Respondent 
The Capitol 
Albany, NY 12224 
DECISION/ORDER/JUDGMENT 
George B. Ceresia, Jr., Justice 
The petitioner, an inmate at Shawangunk Correctional Facility, has commenced the 
instant CPLR Article 78 proceeding to review a determination of respondent dated Junel4, 
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2005 to deny petitioner discretionary release on parole. Petitioner is serving concurrent terms 
of twenty five years to life on three convictions of murder. The petitioner, in his attorney- 
verified petition, points out that he has been denied parole five times. Petitioner’s attorney 
summarized petitioner’s crime in fairly succinct terms: 
“Petitioner’s conviction arose out of an 
argument with three other individuals over the 
intent of those individuals to store stolen 
property at the home of petitioner’s parents, 
which Petitioner refused to allow. Later in the 
day of the initial argument, Petitioner 
encountered said individuals, armed with 
knives, and was attacked by them. During the 
ensuing struggle, Petitioner shot and killed the 
three victims.” 
Petitioner elaborated on the circumstances that led to his incarceration during his June 
14,2005 Parole Hearing. Petitioner indicated that he was involved in an argument with the 
three victims of his crime. This argument allegedly started when the petitioner rehsed to 
allow the decedents to store outboard engines that they had stolen at his parents’ house. 
Following this argument, petitioner, and the decedents went to dinner, where the argument 
allegedly continued. According to petitioner, this argument escalated into violence when the 
decedents attempted to attack him. The petitioner maintains that in the scuffle that ensued, 
two of the three decedents brandished knives, to which the petitioner responded by 
discharging a gun that he had on his person. The petitioner then chased down and shot his 
third victim. 
niiring his p ; i r o l ~ ~  inlcrt i\=n the petitinner eyv-eqwd remawe for havincl - committed 
[* 2 ]
these crimes. He attempted to explain to the board members why he committed these 
offenses, which he attributed to his violent nature as a youth, resulting from family “turmoil” 
and an alleged Attention Deficit Disorder. He pointed out the positive steps that he had taken 
during the course of his incarceration, which included educational achievements and the 
completion of multiple programs. Petitioner also mentioned his lack of violent disciplinary 
problems throughout his incarceration and detailed the plans that he had in the event that he 
was released. 
The petitioner was denied release by the Parole Board on June 14,2005. Following 
an unsuccesshl administrative appeal of this decision the petitioner commenced this Article 
78 proceeding. In his petition, the petitioner alleges that the board’s decision to deny him 
parole was improper because the panel failed to consider all of the statutory factors set forth 
in $259-i of the Executive Law. In his view the Parole Board based it’s decision entirely 
upon the serious nature of his crime. He asserts that the board’s decision to deny him parole 
was a product of an executive policy put in place by the Pataki administration to deny parole 
to violent felony offenders. According to the petitioner, the board’s decision was arbitrary 
and capricious as it did not consider his application individually on the merits, but instead 
ruled on it as part of their policy to deny parole to all violent criminals. Finally, the petitioner 
alleges that the Parole Board’s decision to deny him parole was akin to a re-sentencing, a 
power that they do not possess. 
The petitioner asks the Court to overturn the Parole Board’s decision and order his 
iniiricdiato rcIc.:isI; frLwi c i ! ~ t i d y ,  Tn tlw ,iltcrnntivc. thc pctiticlnsr rqucsts 2 I?r nm-n hrnrinf 
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in front of a different panel to determine if petitioner is entitled to parole. 
The petitioner’s claims are without merit. 
The reasons for the respondent’s determination to deny petitioner release on parole 
are set forth as follows: 
“Your instant offense involves you shooting to 
death your three victims in which you chased down your 
fleeing third victim and shot him to death. You were 
sentenced to three consecutive 25-to-life terms which 
merged by operation of law. 
“Note is made of the positive steps you have taken 
towards programming and education while incarcerated. 
“Due to the serious nature and circumstances of 
your instant offense and your prior violent history and 
propensity towards criminality, the panel has determined 
that, if released at this time, there is a reasonable 
probability that you would not live and remain at liberty 
without again violating the law. Your release is 
incompatible with the safety and welfare of society. 
Therefore parole is denied.” 
As stated in Executive Law $259-1 (2) (C) (A): 
“Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted 
merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient 
performance of duties while confined but after 
considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if 
such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty 
without violating the law, and that his release is not 
incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so 
deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine 
respect for law. In making the parole release decision, the 
guidelines adopted pursuant to subdivision four of 
section two hundred fifty-nine-c of this article shall 
require that the following be considered: (I) the 
institutional record including program goals and 
accomplishments, academic achievements, vocational 
~ t t i i c n t i n t i ,  trnininp c1r n-~rlc nwipnmmtq. thtrny?. nnd 
interpersonal relationships with staff and inmates; (ii) 
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performance, if any, as a participant in a temporary 
release program; (iii) release plans including community 
resources, employment, education and training and 
support services available to the inmate; (iv) any 
deportation order issued by the federal government 
against the inmate [I; (v) any statement made to the board 
by the crime victim or the victim’s representative [I” 
(Executive Law 9259-1 [2] [c] [A]). 
“Parole release decisions are discretionary and, if made pursuant to statutory 
requirements, not reviewable” (Matter of Sinopoli v New York State Board of Parole, 189 
AD2d 960,960 [3rd Dept., 19931, citing h l ~ i t t r  ul’M~-Li.cu \ Tic\\ J’wk State Bd. of Parole, 
157 AD2d 944). If the parole board’s decision is made in accordance with the statutory 
requirements, the board’s determination is not subject to judicial review (see Ristau v. 
Hammock, 103 AD2d 944 [3rd Dept., 19841). Furthermore, only a “showing of irrationality 
bordering on impropriety” on the part of the Parole Board has been found to necessitate 
judicial intervention (see Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 476 [2000], quoting 
Matter of Russo v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 NY2d 69,77 [ 19801). In the absence 
of the above, there is no basis upon which to disturb the discretionary determination made 
by the Parole Board (see Matter 01 Perez v .  N w  I’uA State d Di\.iswii of Parole, 294 
AD2d 726 [3rd Dept., 20021). 
A review of the Parole Board’s transcript from that day reveals that, in addition to the 
instant offense, the parole board considered such things as the petitioner’s past offenses, his 
achievements which included education and the completion of various programs, his 
d i i i p h m y  rewrd, his plans u p n  release, as well as the ktm written on his behalf. 
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Additionally, when asked by the petitioner what he could do to increase the likelihood of his 
release, the Parole Board responded by telling him that: 
“There’s no magic formula that, if you achieve 
this, you graduate. You get your diploma, and you get 
out. That’s not how it works. It’s a combination of the 
answers we feel whether or not they’re truthful from you 
during the interview, what we feel the likelihood is that 
you will be able to go out and successfblly do parole, not 
cause any other injury to anyone else, whether or not 
people continue to have confidence in the criminal 
justice system if we release you, whether or not the 
letters that we may or may not receive from various 
sources, the district attorney, victims, attorneys, judges, 
might play a role in terms of their recommendations. So 
it’s a combination of a whole variety of different things, 
and each one plays a different part to a greater or lesser 
degree in each different case.’’ 
The Court finds that the Parole Board considered the relevant criteria in making its 
decision, and that it’s determination was supported by the record. 
The Parole Board’s decision was sufficiently detailed to inform the petitioner of the 
reasons for the denial of parole and it satisfied the requirements of Executive Law $259-1 
(see Matter of Whitehead v. Russi, 201 AD2d 825 [3rd Dept., 19941; Matter of Green v. New 
York State Division of Parole, 199 AD2d 677 [3rd Dept., 19931). It is proper, and in fact 
required, that the Parole Board consider the seriousness of the inmate’s crimes and their 
violent nature (=Matter uf Weir v. hew k’ork Stale Uivisioil of Parole, 205 AD2d 906,907 
[3rd Dept., 19941; Matter of Sinopoli v. New York State Board of Parole, 189 AD2d 960, 
supra; Matter of Dudley v Travis, 227 AD2d 863, [3rd Dept., 1996). The Parole Board is not 
required to enumerate or give equal weight to each factor that it considered in determining 
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the inmate’s application, or to expressly discuss each one (see Matter of Farid v Travis, supra; 
Matter of Moore v New York State Bd. of Parole, 233 AD2d 653 [3rd Dept., 19961; Matter 
of Collado v New York State Division of Parole, 287 AD2d 92 1 [3rd Dept., 20011). Nor must 
the parole board recite the precise statutory language set forth in the first sentence of 
Executive Law 9 259-1 (2) (C) (A) (see Matter of Silvero v Dennison, 28 AD3d 859 [3rd 
Dept., 20061). In other words, “[wlhere appropriate the Board may give considerable 
weight to, or place particular emphasis on, the circumstances of the crimes for which a 
petitioner is incarcerated, as well as a petitioner’s criminal history, together with the other 
statutory factors, in determining whether the individual ‘will live and remain at liberty 
without violating the law,’ whether his or her ‘release is not incompatible with the welfare 
of society,’ and whether release will ‘deprecate the seriousness of [the] crime as to 
undermine respect for [the] law”’ (hla~kx ol’Uurio v N w  York SLU Divisiun d h r u l c ,  3 
AD3d 816 [3rd Dept., 20041, quoting Executive Law $259-1 [2] [c] [A], other citations 
omitted). 
The record does not support petitioner’s assertion that the decision was predetermined 
consistent with an alleged executive branch policy mandating denial of parole to all violent 
felony offenders. The Court, accordingly, finds no merit to the argument (see Matter of 
Lue-Shing v Patnki, 301 AD2d 827, 828 [3rd Dept., 20031; Matter ol‘Yerez v State ol‘New 
York Division of Parole, 294 AD2d 726 [3rd Dept., 20021; Matter of Jones v Travis, 293 
AD2d 800,801 [3rd Dept., 20021; Matter of Little v Travis, 15 AD3d 698 [3rd Dept., 20051, 
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Petitioner's claims that the determination to deny parole is tantamount to a re- 
sentencing are conclusory and without merit (= h l m c r  t ) [ '  t h ~ k c i i o  i Ncu j ' o r k  Siatc 
Parole Board, 227AD2d 751 [3rd Dept., 19961; k l~ i t i c r  ~)i'C't'ei~> I Ncii \'ark 5i;itc. 1. s t L w i i i  t' 
Deaartment Board of Appeals Unit, 281 AD2d 672 [3rd Dept., 20011; Matter of Evans v 
Dennison, 13 Misc3d 1236A [Sup. Ct., Westchester Co., 20061). Moreover, it is well settled 
that the Parole Board is vested with the discretion to determine whether release was 
appropriate notwithstanding the fact that the sentencing court set the minimum term of 
petitioner's sentence (e Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 NY2d 470,476 [2000]; Matter of 
Cody v Dennison, 33 AD2d 1141, 1142 [3rd Dept., 20061 lv denied 8 NY3d 802 [2007]; 
Matter of Burress v Dennison, 37 AD3d 930 [3rd Dept., 20071). 
The Court has reviewed petitioner's remaining arguments and finds them to be without 
merit. 
The Court finds the decision of the Parole Board was not irrational, in violation of 
lawfbl procedure, affected by an error of law, irrational or arbitrary and capricious. The 
petition must therefore be dismissed'. 
Accordingly, it is 
ORDERED and ADJUDGED, that the petition be and hereby is dismissed. 
This shall constitute the decision, order and judgment of the Court. All papers are 
'The Court also observes that the petitioner was scheduled for another parole interview in 
June of 2007. The Department of Corrections' website reveals that the petitioner did in fact 
reappear before the Parole Board in June of 2007. He was denied parole and ordered to be held 
lbr ;UI adclirioul ~rrc;nl )  Iuur ~ w n L h ~ .  This bcmg thc cast', fL nould ;~lso q p u u  tliuf thc iiisLuL 
petition is now moot. 
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returned to the attorney for the respondent who is directed to enter this 
Decision/Order/Judgment without notice and to serve petitioner with a copy of this 
DecisiodOrder with notice of entry. 
I 
ENTER 
Dated: October ,2007 
Troy, New York 
George B. Ceresia, Jr. 
Papers Considered: 
1 .  
2. 
Petitioner’s Notice of Petition dated November 3,2006, Petition, Supporting 
Papers and Exhibits 
Respondent’s Verified Answer dated December 5 ,  2006, Supporting Papers 
and Exhibits 
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